Proof-of-concept proving the diagnostics-redaction exit criterion from
docs/architecture/proof-of-concept-plan.md §2:
"Password and identity-secret samples are redacted."
Full coverage of the audit-report test matrix in
docs/security/diagnostic-redaction-audit-report.md §4
(REDACT-TC-001..010), plus two sanity tests.
The spike ships:
- RedactionPolicy: typed catalogue of regex rules
(identity-base64-blob, password-kv, ts3server-url-password,
authorization-bearer, linux/windows/macos user-path) with
optional capture-group narrowing.
- Structured-field redaction keyed on case-insensitive name
substrings (password, secret, token, ...).
- Bundle-level switches: chat and channel tree excluded by
default per audit-report §5.
- KnownSecretRegistry: literal-substring scrub for secrets the
host application has already loaded into memory (defense in
depth that regexes alone cannot guarantee — closes the gap
behind REDACT-TC-002).
- Length cap (MAX_PROTOCOL_STRING_LEN = 256) with truncation
marker for REDACT-TC-009.
- UTF-8 preserved in non-sensitive fields per REDACT-TC-010 /
ADR-008.
Test suite (12/12 PASS on 2026-05-13):
REDACT-TC-001 server password in connection data
REDACT-TC-002 identity secret in storage error (via KnownSecretRegistry)
REDACT-TC-003 server URL with password field
REDACT-TC-004 chat text excluded by default
REDACT-TC-005 channel name with Unicode excluded by default
REDACT-TC-006 nickname with Unicode preserved in safe field
REDACT-TC-007 local file path user segment minimized
REDACT-TC-008 mixed sensitive bundle (whole-bundle JSON scan)
REDACT-TC-009 long hostile protocol string truncated
REDACT-TC-010 multilingual safe text preserved
+ known-secret literal scrub
+ empty registered secret ignored
Out of scope: tracing-subscriber integration, diagnostic export
file format, memory/core dumps, performance, adversarial regex
evasion beyond trivial cases. These belong to chanora_diagnostics.
Authority: PoC plan §2, docs/security/diagnostic-redaction-audit-report.md,
SRS-093, SysRS-152/154/155.
Not product code; not promoted into chanora_diagnostics.
Proof-of-concept proving the SQLite-storage exit criterion from
docs/architecture/proof-of-concept-plan.md §2:
"Schema, migration, and repository pattern are demonstrated."
Also satisfies the SRS-089 acceptance criteria explicitly:
"Storage implementation uses an embedded local data store and
migration mechanism."
Implements:
- A forward-only Migrator over a fixed Migration list, tracking
the applied version via PRAGMA user_version. Each migration is
applied inside an IMMEDIATE transaction; rolled back on failure.
- Three canonical migrations (initial schema, add nickname,
add last_connected_at) demonstrating ALTER TABLE flows.
- A LocalDatabaseRepository implementing both BookmarkRepository
and SettingsRepository traits.
- Bookmark.identity_ref is a reference to a secret name, never
a secret value (cross-checked by the secure-storage spike's
SS-AUD-001/002 scans). This is the SAD-067 separation.
Test suite (11/11 PASS on 2026-05-13):
- migrator brings fresh DB to latest version
- migrator is idempotent (no-op when already current)
- migrator applies only pending versions (catch-up upgrade)
- migrator rejects out-of-order versions
- migrator rejects DB newer than known migrations (downgrade guard)
- failed migration rolls back atomically
- bookmark CRUD round-trip
- bookmark list ordered by recency
- bookmark UNIQUE(host, identity_ref) enforcement
- settings upsert + delete
- open creates file and persists across reopen
Surfaced finding for the decision register: DEC-013 does not pin a
SQLite crate. The PoC uses rusqlite with the bundled feature
(no system libsqlite3 dependency); production code needs an
owner ruling on rusqlite vs. sqlx vs. sea-orm.
Authority: PoC plan §2, SRS-089, SDD-077, SAD-067,
SysDes-033/036/049/091.
Not product code; not promoted into chanora_storage.
Proof-of-concept proving the secure-storage exit criterion from
docs/architecture/proof-of-concept-plan.md §2:
"Secret write/read/delete works through platform secure storage."
Implements a typed SecretStorageRepository trait per ADR-006
(SecureStore + per-platform adapters) and a Linux adapter (the only
adapter in PoC scope) that supports both equivalent Linux backends
per SysRS-053/SysRS-162: Secret Service (libsecret) and kernel
keyutils.
The audit test suite covers:
SS-AUD-001 identity secret absent from local DB (raw file scan)
SS-AUD-002 server password absent from local DB
SS-AUD-003 secrets absent from logs (Secret newtype redaction)
SS-AUD-005 failure returns safe typed error (NotFound)
SS-AUD-006 delete removes entry
SS-TC-003 Linux round-trip set/get/delete
Verified on 2026-05-13 against the local keyutils backend (cargo
test runs need 'keyctl session -' to provide a valid session
keyring under non-interactive shells, documented in the spike
README). The CLI driver additionally observed a real locked
gnome-keyring collection and exercised the typed-error → fallback
path live.
Surfaced finding for the decision register: DEC-013 does not pin
a Linux secure-storage backend policy. Both Secret Service and
keyutils are 'equivalent' per the requirements; production code
needs an owner ruling.
Out of scope: Windows DPAPI, macOS/iOS Keychain, Android Keystore,
SS-AUD-004 (covered by diagnostics-redaction spike), SS-AUD-007/008
(process / migration items).
Authority: PoC plan §2, ADR-006, SDD-078, SRS-091..095,
SysRS-158..162.
Not product code; not promoted into chanora_storage.
Proof-of-concept proving the Flutter/Rust bridge exit criterion from
docs/architecture/proof-of-concept-plan.md §2:
"Flutter can call Rust and receive event stream data."
The spike exposes one synchronous fallible command (greet) returning
a typed GreetResult / GreetError DTO, and one async event stream
(counter_stream) emitting typed CounterTick events. The Flutter app
demonstrates both flows on a Material 3 surface; the headless test
suite in test/poc_verification_test.dart exercises the same API
directly through dart:ffi.
Verified on 2026-05-13 (Linux desktop, Flutter 3.41.9 / Dart 3.11.5,
flutter_rust_bridge 2.12.0, Rust 1.95). All three tests pass:
- greet() returns typed result for valid input
- greet() surfaces typed error for empty input
- counterStream() delivers the expected event sequence
Authority: PoC plan §2, DEC-014 (typed Flutter/Rust bridge),
SAD-068, SDD-079, SysDes-049.
Naming note: the PoC plan lists this as flutter-rust-bridge-hello,
but Dart pubspec.yaml package names require underscores; the
directory uses underscores accordingly.
Not product code; not promoted into chanora_bridge.
Layout note: includes the full Flutter platform scaffold (android,
ios, macos, windows, web, linux). Only the Linux desktop target has
been built and verified.
Proof-of-concept proving the protocol-feasibility exit criterion from
docs/architecture/proof-of-concept-plan.md §2:
"Rust can connect to a compatible server/test double."
The spike opens a tsclientlib connection, waits for the BookEvents
state snapshot, subscribes to the server channel tree, prints
server metadata and the channel tree with client names, and
disconnects cleanly. Audio feature is disabled because audio is
covered by a separate PoC.
Verified on 2026-05-13 against cn.teamspeak.app (TeamSpeak 3 server
3.13.7); 36 channels and 5 online clients retrieved with full
UTF-8 (CJK) preservation. See
poc/tsclientlib-connect-spike/VERIFICATION.md for the captured run.
Authority: PoC plan §2, SysRS-005, SysDes-011, SysDes-029.
Not product code; not promoted into chanora_protocol.
EdisonJwa