Layered test coverage for the Windows PTT subsystem ahead of the
v1.0.0-rc.8 official release sign-off.
L0 (refactor)
- Extract three pure-logic dispatchers from the existing WndProc /
LowLevelKeyboardProc / LowLevelMouseProc bodies in
crates/chanora_audio/src/ptt_backends/windows.rs:
dispatch_raw_input(ctx, &RAWINPUT)
dispatch_hook_keyboard(ctx, wparam, &KBDLLHOOKSTRUCT)
dispatch_hook_mouse(ctx, wparam, &MSLLHOOKSTRUCT)
Each takes a small Context (AtomicBinding + AudioTransmitGate +
flags) and is callable without spinning up any Win32 plumbing.
The real Win32 procs unchanged structurally; they unpack lparam
and forward to the dispatchers. AtomicBinding / RawInputContext
/ HookContext / resolve_binding are now pub(crate) so the
in-file test module can drive them.
L1 — windows_keymap full-table sweep (+13 tests)
Every key_label_to_vk arm, all A-Z + a-z, all 0-9, F1-F20,
navigation, modifiers, OEM punctuation, numpad. Exhaustive
mouse_label_to_button cases including the 0x08 / 0x10 /
unknown-bitmask fallbacks.
L2 — AtomicBinding lock-free correctness
store/read round-trip, clear(), Default = zeros, single-writer
/ single-reader concurrency, many-readers / single-writer.
L3 — resolve_binding dispatcher tests
All PttInputClass variants, well-known labels, unknown-label
fallback, mismatched class+label rejection, mouse bitmask
resolution.
L4 — Backend state-machine
Both WindowsRawInputBackend and WindowsHookBackend:
descriptor() pre-arm vs post-arm (L0Focused -> L2/L3), start()
with None binding rejection, rebind() in-place, stop()
clears + idempotent, stop() after stop() no-op.
L5 — dispatch_raw_input table
Keyboard match/non-match, key-down/key-up via Flags & 0x01,
no-binding short-circuit, mouse XBUTTON1/XBUTTON2 down/up
matching the bound button, unhandled HID type. RAWINPUT structs
built via mem::zeroed plus field-fill, owning the unsafe in
the test layer where it belongs.
L6 — dispatch_hook_keyboard + dispatch_hook_mouse
WM_KEYDOWN / WM_KEYUP / WM_SYSKEYDOWN / WM_SYSKEYUP for the
keyboard path, WM_XBUTTONDOWN / WM_XBUTTONUP for the mouse
path. Same shape as L5.
L7 — Privacy invariant (crates/chanora_audio/tests/ptt_privacy.rs)
New cross-platform integration test installs a custom
tracing_subscriber Layer that records every emitted event's
target + field names. Exercises the public PTT API plus (on
Windows) the backend factory. Asserts no field name in the
banned list (vk, scan_code, keysym, key_label, bound_key,
binding, platform_key, VKey, wVk, wScan, kbflags, mouseflags)
is ever emitted and every field belongs to the DEC-027
allow-list. Adds tracing-subscriber as a dev-dependency on
chanora_audio.
L8 — Full-chain integration in core/chanora_core/src/ptt.rs
Windows-only mod windows_full_chain_tests:
zero-tail full chain (synchronous)
default-tail full chain (200 ms wait then off)
mid-press rebind abandons in-flight press
L9/L10/L11 — tools/windows-smoke.cmd + tools/windows-smoke.md
Batch smoke script + operator doc. cargo build, flutter build,
artifact existence + size checks, headless launch with stderr
capture, bridge-initialised log assertion. Distinct exit codes
per failure step. Doc explains invocation + common failure
modes.
Verification (Linux)
- cargo check --workspace: clean.
- cargo test --workspace: 78 passed / 0 failed / 3 ignored.
76 cross-platform unit tests (unchanged) plus the new
ptt_privacy integration test plus one new ignored portal smoke
test.
The Windows-gated tests (~49 new) compile and run on the Korean
Windows 11 host where they belong; cross-compile from Linux is
not configured locally. The smoke script is the production
acceptance gate for rc.8 on Windows.
Deviations from the original plan are minor (single ignored
real-runtime test rather than per-platform attribute, L7 uses
public API rather than pub(crate) dispatchers, dispatchers live
inside windows.rs rather than a sibling module) and documented
in the subagent report.
220 lines
7.5 KiB
Rust
220 lines
7.5 KiB
Rust
//! Privacy invariant integration test (DEC-027 / SDD-090 / SAD-077).
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//!
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//! Every `tracing` event emitted while exercising the public-API
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//! surface of the PTT subsystem must carry only field names from a
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//! known allow-list, and never any of the banned key-data field
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//! names. The test installs a cross-platform recording `Layer`,
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//! drives the backends and the keymap through realistic scenarios,
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//! and asserts the captured records honour both invariants.
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//!
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//! This test is platform-agnostic to compile — the recording layer
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//! is generic, the assertions are generic — but the
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//! Windows-specific dispatcher / backend exercise lives under a
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//! `#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]` block. On Linux and macOS the
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//! test exercises only the cross-platform pieces (`AudioTransmitGate`,
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//! `MissedKeyUpWatchdog`, `PttBinding`, `PttInputClass`) which are
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//! sufficient to verify the privacy invariant on those hosts.
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use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
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use tracing::subscriber::with_default;
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use tracing_subscriber::layer::{Context, SubscriberExt};
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use tracing_subscriber::registry::LookupSpan;
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use tracing_subscriber::Layer;
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/// Banned field names per DEC-027 / SDD-090. The test fails fast
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/// if any emitted record carries one of these names.
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const BANNED_FIELDS: &[&str] = &[
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"vk",
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"scan_code",
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"scancode",
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"keysym",
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"keysym_string",
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"key_label",
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"bound_key",
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"binding",
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"platform_key",
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"VKey",
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"wVk",
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"wScan",
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"kbflags",
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"mouseflags",
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"key_code",
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"virtual_key",
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"key_sequence",
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"key_press_history",
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"key_timing",
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];
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/// Allow-list of field names that may appear in a PTT-subsystem
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/// tracing record. Anything outside this set is a privacy
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/// regression even if it is not on the banned list — the spec
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/// uses an allow-list precisely to catch new field additions
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/// before they can leak.
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const ALLOWED_FIELDS: &[&str] = &[
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"backend_id",
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"bound_input_class",
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"capability_level",
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"host_id",
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"timeout_secs",
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"error",
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"event",
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"message",
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"target",
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"level",
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];
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/// Captured shape of a single tracing event. We hold only field
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/// names — values would defeat the privacy intent of the test.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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struct Captured {
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target: String,
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field_names: Vec<String>,
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}
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/// `tracing_subscriber::Layer` that records every emitted event's
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/// target + field-name set. The records live in a `Mutex<Vec>`
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/// shared with the test body.
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#[derive(Clone, Default)]
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struct RecordingLayer {
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records: Arc<Mutex<Vec<Captured>>>,
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}
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impl RecordingLayer {
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fn snapshot(&self) -> Vec<Captured> {
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self.records.lock().unwrap().clone()
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}
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}
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#[derive(Default)]
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struct NameCollector(Vec<String>);
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impl tracing::field::Visit for NameCollector {
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fn record_debug(&mut self, field: &tracing::field::Field, _value: &dyn std::fmt::Debug) {
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self.0.push(field.name().to_string());
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}
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fn record_str(&mut self, field: &tracing::field::Field, _value: &str) {
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self.0.push(field.name().to_string());
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}
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fn record_i64(&mut self, field: &tracing::field::Field, _value: i64) {
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self.0.push(field.name().to_string());
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}
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fn record_u64(&mut self, field: &tracing::field::Field, _value: u64) {
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self.0.push(field.name().to_string());
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}
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fn record_bool(&mut self, field: &tracing::field::Field, _value: bool) {
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self.0.push(field.name().to_string());
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}
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}
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impl<S> Layer<S> for RecordingLayer
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where
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S: tracing::Subscriber + for<'a> LookupSpan<'a>,
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{
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fn on_event(&self, event: &tracing::Event<'_>, _ctx: Context<'_, S>) {
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let mut names = NameCollector::default();
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event.record(&mut names);
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let captured = Captured {
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target: event.metadata().target().to_string(),
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field_names: names.0,
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};
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self.records.lock().unwrap().push(captured);
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}
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}
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/// Assert the captured records honour the DEC-027 banned-field
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/// rule and the allow-list. Only records from the chanora targets
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/// participate — host-side tracing-subscriber chatter (e.g. the
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/// tokio runtime) is ignored.
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fn assert_privacy_invariants(records: &[Captured]) {
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let relevant: Vec<&Captured> = records
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.iter()
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.filter(|r| r.target.starts_with("chanora_"))
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.collect();
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for r in &relevant {
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for name in &r.field_names {
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assert!(
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!BANNED_FIELDS.contains(&name.as_str()),
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"banned field {name:?} emitted by target {:?}",
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r.target
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);
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assert!(
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ALLOWED_FIELDS.contains(&name.as_str()),
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"field {name:?} from target {:?} is not in the allow-list",
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r.target
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);
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}
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn ptt_subsystem_never_emits_banned_or_unknown_fields() {
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let layer = RecordingLayer::default();
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let subscriber = tracing_subscriber::registry().with(layer.clone());
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with_default(subscriber, || {
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// Cross-platform paths: AudioTransmitGate transitions
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// (these emit no tracing themselves but exercise the
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// public surface); PttBinding / PttInputClass construction.
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use chanora_audio::ptt_backends::{PttBinding, PttInputClass};
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use chanora_audio::AudioTransmitGate;
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let gate = AudioTransmitGate::new(false);
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gate.set(true);
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gate.set(false);
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let _ = gate.load();
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let _ = PttBinding::none();
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let _ = PttBinding {
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input_class: PttInputClass::Keyboard,
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platform_key: "Space".to_string(),
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};
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let _ = PttInputClass::Keyboard.as_str();
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let _ = PttInputClass::MouseSideButton.as_str();
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// Platform-specific dispatcher paths. These live behind
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// the cfg gate; cross-platform we still get coverage of
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// the cross-platform surface above which is enough to
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// catch any accidental info!/warn! that names a banned
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// field at module init time.
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#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
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windows_exercise();
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});
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let records = layer.snapshot();
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assert_privacy_invariants(&records);
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}
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#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
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fn windows_exercise() {
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// The Windows backend types are intentionally not part of
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// chanora_audio's public API (they live in
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// `crate::ptt_backends::windows` as `pub(crate)`). The privacy
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// invariant for those code paths is enforced by the dispatcher
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// unit tests inside `windows.rs` itself, where the same
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// recording layer pattern is used. From here we simply
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// exercise the `select_ptt_backend` factory + descriptor +
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// start/stop lifecycle through the public trait surface so
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// any info!/warn! the factory or the backend's `start` path
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// emits is captured by the layer.
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use chanora_audio::ptt_backends::{select_ptt_backend, PttBinding, PttInputClass};
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use chanora_audio::AudioTransmitGate;
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let mut backend = select_ptt_backend();
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let gate = AudioTransmitGate::new(false);
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let binding = PttBinding {
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input_class: PttInputClass::Keyboard,
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platform_key: "Space".to_string(),
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};
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// Best-effort: in the CI sandbox the actual Raw Input /
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// hook registration may fail. The privacy invariant is
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// about field names, not about whether the start succeeds.
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let _ = backend.start(gate, binding);
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let _ = backend.descriptor();
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let bad_binding = PttBinding {
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input_class: PttInputClass::Keyboard,
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platform_key: "Banana".to_string(),
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};
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let _ = backend.rebind(bad_binding);
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backend.stop();
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}
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