Files
chanora/poc/diagnostics-redaction-spike/src/policy.rs
T
EdisonJwa 06ec6f2965 feat(poc/diagnostics): add diagnostics-redaction spike
Proof-of-concept proving the diagnostics-redaction exit criterion from
docs/architecture/proof-of-concept-plan.md §2:
  "Password and identity-secret samples are redacted."

Full coverage of the audit-report test matrix in
docs/security/diagnostic-redaction-audit-report.md §4
(REDACT-TC-001..010), plus two sanity tests.

The spike ships:
  - RedactionPolicy: typed catalogue of regex rules
    (identity-base64-blob, password-kv, ts3server-url-password,
     authorization-bearer, linux/windows/macos user-path) with
    optional capture-group narrowing.
  - Structured-field redaction keyed on case-insensitive name
    substrings (password, secret, token, ...).
  - Bundle-level switches: chat and channel tree excluded by
    default per audit-report §5.
  - KnownSecretRegistry: literal-substring scrub for secrets the
    host application has already loaded into memory (defense in
    depth that regexes alone cannot guarantee — closes the gap
    behind REDACT-TC-002).
  - Length cap (MAX_PROTOCOL_STRING_LEN = 256) with truncation
    marker for REDACT-TC-009.
  - UTF-8 preserved in non-sensitive fields per REDACT-TC-010 /
    ADR-008.

Test suite (12/12 PASS on 2026-05-13):
  REDACT-TC-001 server password in connection data
  REDACT-TC-002 identity secret in storage error (via KnownSecretRegistry)
  REDACT-TC-003 server URL with password field
  REDACT-TC-004 chat text excluded by default
  REDACT-TC-005 channel name with Unicode excluded by default
  REDACT-TC-006 nickname with Unicode preserved in safe field
  REDACT-TC-007 local file path user segment minimized
  REDACT-TC-008 mixed sensitive bundle (whole-bundle JSON scan)
  REDACT-TC-009 long hostile protocol string truncated
  REDACT-TC-010 multilingual safe text preserved
  + known-secret literal scrub
  + empty registered secret ignored

Out of scope: tracing-subscriber integration, diagnostic export
file format, memory/core dumps, performance, adversarial regex
evasion beyond trivial cases. These belong to chanora_diagnostics.

Authority: PoC plan §2, docs/security/diagnostic-redaction-audit-report.md,
SRS-093, SysRS-152/154/155.
Not product code; not promoted into chanora_diagnostics.
2026-05-14 12:26:49 +08:00

154 lines
4.9 KiB
Rust

//! Redaction policy: the catalogue of patterns and structural rules
//! the redactor applies.
use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
use regex::Regex;
/// A single regex-driven rule.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RedactionRule {
pub id: &'static str,
pub description: &'static str,
pub pattern: Regex,
/// If `Some(n)`, the rule replaces capture-group `n` rather than
/// the whole match. Useful for "ts3server://host?password=XXXX"
/// where the host should be preserved but `XXXX` redacted.
pub redact_group: Option<usize>,
}
impl RedactionRule {
pub fn new(
id: &'static str,
description: &'static str,
pattern: &str,
) -> Self {
Self {
id,
description,
pattern: Regex::new(pattern).expect("static rule regex must compile"),
redact_group: None,
}
}
pub fn new_group(
id: &'static str,
description: &'static str,
pattern: &str,
group: usize,
) -> Self {
Self {
id,
description,
pattern: Regex::new(pattern).expect("static rule regex must compile"),
redact_group: Some(group),
}
}
}
/// The full redaction policy.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RedactionPolicy {
pub rules: Vec<RedactionRule>,
/// Structured-field redaction: any key whose lower-cased name
/// contains one of these substrings is fully redacted in
/// diagnostic bundles. Mirrors the bundle policy in
/// `diagnostic-redaction-audit-report.md` §5.
pub redact_field_substrings: Vec<&'static str>,
/// Bundle-level: include chat messages? Audit-report default = No.
pub include_chat: bool,
/// Bundle-level: include channel tree details?
pub include_channel_tree: bool,
}
/// Hard upper bound on protocol-string lengths kept in diagnostics.
///
/// REDACT-TC-009 ("long hostile protocol string"): truncate or safely
/// escape. The PoC truncates with a clear marker.
pub const MAX_PROTOCOL_STRING_LEN: usize = 256;
impl RedactionPolicy {
/// The default policy used by the PoC. Mirrors the audit-report
/// catalogue. Production code (`chanora_diagnostics`) will own the
/// canonical version of this list.
pub fn default_policy() -> Self {
Self {
rules: DEFAULT_RULES.clone(),
redact_field_substrings: vec![
"password",
"secret",
"private_key",
"private-key",
"identity_key",
"identity-key",
"token",
"credential",
"passphrase",
],
include_chat: false,
include_channel_tree: false,
}
}
}
static DEFAULT_RULES: Lazy<Vec<RedactionRule>> = Lazy::new(|| {
vec![
// Identity secret as it appears in `tsclientlib` style:
// long base64-ish run preceded by a known marker.
// We err on the side of catching base64 blobs >= 64 chars.
RedactionRule::new(
"identity-base64-blob",
"Long base64-like run; matches identity secrets and tokens.",
r"\b[A-Za-z0-9+/]{64,}={0,2}\b",
),
// `password = "..."` / `password: "..."` / `password=...`
// Captures the value in group 1 so the *key* name is kept.
// The value excludes separators commonly found in URL query
// strings and config lines (`& , ; " whitespace`).
RedactionRule::new_group(
"password-kv",
"key=value style password assignment.",
r#"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*"?([^"\s,;&]+)"?"#,
1,
),
// ts3server://host?password=XXXX&...
RedactionRule::new_group(
"ts3server-url-password",
"Password embedded in a ts3server:// URL query string.",
r"(?i)(?:[?&])password=([^&\s]+)",
1,
),
// Generic Authorization: Bearer ...
RedactionRule::new_group(
"authorization-bearer",
"Authorization header bearer token.",
r"(?i)Authorization:\s*Bearer\s+(\S+)",
1,
),
// Linux user home: /home/<user>/... → minimize the username
// segment. Captures group 1 = username.
RedactionRule::new_group(
"linux-home-path",
"Linux home-directory path; minimizes the username segment.",
r"(/home/)([^/\s]+)",
2,
),
// Windows user: C:\Users\<user>\...
RedactionRule::new_group(
"windows-user-path",
"Windows user-profile path; minimizes the username segment.",
r"(?i)([A-Z]:\\Users\\)([^\\\s]+)",
2,
),
// macOS user: /Users/<user>/...
RedactionRule::new_group(
"macos-user-path",
"macOS user-profile path; minimizes the username segment.",
r"(/Users/)([^/\s]+)",
2,
),
]
});