34 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
34 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
# Chanora Threat Model
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**Document status:** DV meeting baseline candidate
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**Date:** 2026-05-29
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## 1. Scope
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This threat model covers the Chanora client, local storage, diagnostics, bridge boundary, protocol adapter, audio path, platform services, and release artifacts. External compatible servers are outside Chanora control.
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## 2. Assets
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| Asset | Protection goal |
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| Server passwords and identities | Prevent plaintext persistence and diagnostic leakage |
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| Voice audio | Avoid unintended transmit and preserve user control |
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| Diagnostic logs | Redact secrets before user-initiated export |
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| Local bookmarks/settings | Preserve integrity and avoid accidental disclosure |
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| Release artifacts | Preserve integrity and accurate capability claims |
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## 3. Primary Threats
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| Threat | Mitigation | Current DV status |
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| Secret leakage in diagnostics | Known-secret registry and redactor | Requires export evidence |
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| Plaintext or weak secret storage | Platform secure-storage abstraction and encryption | Android DEK waiver active |
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| Stuck push-to-talk transmit | Missed-key-up watchdog and transmit gate | Requires platform PTT evidence |
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| Protocol-library leakage into UI | Protocol adapter isolation | Architecture baseline covers boundary |
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| Malicious or misconfigured external server | Treat server as external dependency and expose safe errors | Requires compatible-server/negative evidence |
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| Over-claiming platform support | Capability records and release policy | Release record controls claims |
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## 4. DV Conclusion
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Major threats and mitigations are identified. Final release requires audit evidence for secure storage, diagnostics, platform PTT, and release artifacts.
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